Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Since the late 1980's, the United States (US) has conducted an increasing number of operations other than war to include attempts at post-conflict reconstruction. Success in these operations has been elusive. The US interventions in Panama, 1989, Somalia, 1992-1994, and Haiti, 1994, provide excellent case studies for determining the foundational causes of its poor performance.
DISCONNECTED STRATEGIES: WHY SUCCESS IS ELUSIVE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION
"While we have historically focused on war fighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations-other than war." easily. Commanders and planners of most contemporary operations profess the sentiment that they are comfortable planning and executing combat operations but find operations other than war complex and frustrating. The cause of this discomfort is the fact that the national security community did not begin to think seriously about and train to conduct these operations at any level within the US Government until it became clear in the mid-1990's that US power would be employed most frequently in operations other than war. The absence of necessary national security structures and processes contributed to uneven results in our attempts to solve the complex problems associated with operations other than war. An analysis of three of these operations yields a consistent lesson. The US Government must develop a process that effectively melds national and operational level strategies in a manner that creates unified effort.
Without such a process we will not have the capability to achieve our strategic objectives in operations other than war.
The world strategic situation became more complex with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The economic and political influence exerted by the US and the USSR on their allies and clients contained most conflict. The absence of this influence created conditions that fueled both intrastate and inter-state conflict. US national security professionals, who had focused their intellectual effort on containing the USSR, began to resurrect and develop a body of knowledge to enhance US effectiveness in operations other than war. Lieutenant General (LTG) Paul
Gorman published the foundational article in 1984 titled "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda, Not
Kola." LTG Gorman argued that the US must have a strategy and a force capable of dealing with non-conventional threats. 2 In 1986 General John Galvin The need to adhere to these principles was a result of four unique requirements of operations other than war identified by experience: the need to gain the support and acceptance of the supported people; a narrower gap between strategic and tactical considerations, concepts, and consequences; the complexity and holistic nature of the situations; and the need for unified application of all elements of national power in order to succeed. General Galvin argued that it is necessary to have a defined structure and process, on which the various contributors are trained, in order to achieve long-term strategic success. 6 Unfortunately, such an effective structure and process does not exist.
The focus of this paper is stability and reconstruction operations. Its purpose is to identify the reasons that we are unable to successfully conduct them, discuss the most significant efforts to improve our capacity to do so and why they have fallen short, and finally, describe the necessary solutions to apply the elements of national power in a manner that achieves US strategic objectives.
The US interventions in Panama, Somalia, and Haiti provide ideal case studies and are the basis of the analysis. This analysis will show that there are three common elements at the heart of US failures; poorly developed and articulated objectives, lack of unity of effort, and an incongruence among ends, ways, and means. It will also show that these deficiencies exist because there is no structure in place to ensure unified effort in such complex operations and because key leaders change at critical junctures in the unfolding of crises.
JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY: PANAMA 1989-1991
The US executed Operation Just Cause after more than two years of increasingly strained relations between the US and Panama. The US lost patience with General Manuel Noriega's corrupt and repressive leadership and indicted him for narco-trafficking in 1988. 7 The US objectives were to protect US citizens, capture Noriega and bring him to justice, ensure the viability of the Panama Canal and the free exercise of Canal Treaty rights, and restore democracy. 11 To varying degrees the US ultimately achieved each of these objectives.
However, a number of flaws in the US strategy became apparent in the aftermath of the invasion and in the pace of Panama's recovery. Looting, which cost Panama between one and two billion US dollars, began the morning of the invasion and lasted for four days. 12 The
Organization of American States and much of the international community condemned the invasion, questioned President Endara's legitimacy as the new president, and provided no support for Panama's recovery. 13 The prolonged absence of a legitimate security force and judiciary system hindered the restoration of the rule of law. In December 1990, former members of the PDF attempted a coup that US forces defeated, further undermining the legitimacy of the Endara government. 14 By January 1991, the Panamanian people had become increasingly disenchanted with the Endara Government and began to believe that the US had deceived them. 15 These and a number of other obstacles significantly hindered Panama's recovery.
One of the primary causes of these problems was the fact that President Bush and his advisors' failed to rigorously evaluate and clearly articulate the operation's strategic objectives, especially the objective "restore democracy." Panama had no real democratic tradition from which to develop democratic institutional and societal structures. 16 The Panamanian government could more accurately have been described as praetorian with the civilian population subordinated to the will of the PDF. 17 When General Noriega, who had been the PDF G-2 under President Torrijos, came to power in 1983 he gained complete control of the PDF and ensured that the PDF gained and retained control of Panama. 18 Using the phrase "restore democracy" understated the requirement and as a result the US employed inadequate concepts and resources to emplace a democratic government, arguably the most important strategic objective. 21 General Thurman acknowledged that he had spent all of his effort on Just Cause and no more than five minutes reviewing or revising Promote Liberty. 22 When General Thurman changed the concept for the initial assault he did not account for the effect that the change would have on Promote Liberty.
The original plan called for the gradual build-up of forces inside of Panama City. This was designed to intimidate the PDF and to deter looting and disorder. 23 Panamanian looters took advantage of the absence of forces and significantly damaged the economy. The looting and disorder also created a perception of US ineffectiveness.
The decision to compartmentalize planning also led to the lack of involvement of other critical government agencies in both the planning and the execution of Promote Liberty. 24 The US Ambassador to Panama complained that the reason the State Department was unprepared to do its share was that it was not aware of the probability of military action. 25 The Department of Justice did not become fully involved in assisting with the development of a new police force and did not even have a permanent staff in Panama until six months after Just Cause. 26 The absence of interagency involvement necessitated SOUTHCOM to form an ad hoc organization for the coordination of post-conflict reconstruction called the Military Support Group (MSG). The MSG was led by a Colonel, staffed primarily by rotating reservists, and filled to only fifty percent of its required strength. 27 Even with these shortcomings it performed extremely well. The dearth of national level resources, however, prevented a much more effective and rapid recovery.
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In addition to problematic objectives and a lack of unified effort, there were disconnects among the ends, ways, and means within the Panama strategy. A damaging flaw was the lack of a detailed strategic level concept for post-hostility operations. 29 This was apparent in the absence of feasible plans to build a legitimate police force and judicial system, rehabilitate the country's infrastructure, provide economic assistance, rebuild the country team, and hold elections. Two years after Just Cause the US Ambassador remained dissatisfied with the staffing of the US Embassy. 30 By early 1991, the US Congress had provided only 100 million US dollars of the one billion promised by President Bush. 31 The Panamanian judiciary began to function only because the US Army South (USARSO) Commander provided his legal staff to advise and assist in restoring a credible legal system. 32 The lack of an integrated strategy had three significant consequences; insufficient resources, growing disenchantment with the Endara government and US presence, and a slow national recovery. President Endara stated that the "US did not have a specific plan for helping us in establishing democracy." 33 He was correct.
There A second reason for the incomplete strategy was the lack of an interagency and strategic level planning process. 35 A member of the DOD/SOLIC staff commented that he attended only two interagency meetings and these did not occur until January 1990. 36 supplies, and assistance to the UN and relief organizations in providing humanitarian aid. 44 This was well short of the UN mandate and without US support the mandate was not achievable.
The principle of unity of effort was violated in a number of ways to include the disconnection of security and relief operations and the establishment of a dual chain of command. That operations to provide a secure environment and humanitarian assistance were not unified was a major error. The relief effort was the primary purpose of the mission and depended almost entirely upon the success of the security mission. UN and private relief organizations were present in Somalia but UNITAF did not choose to coordinate with them prior to its arrival. Relief organizations were unaware of the details of the UNITAF mission and could not plan accordingly. 45 The UNITAF Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) but they were not proximate to the UNITAF command post. Operational commanders and staff members did not visit the CMOC/HOC and UNITAF was not easily accessible to the relief organizations. The UNITAF staff viewed the CMOC as a less important organization and it seemed as if the two operations were parallel but not interdependent. 46 The command and control arrangement of UNOSOM II also created a lack of unity of effort. UNOSOM II maintained a dual chain of command (figure 1) in which CENTCOM controlled TF Ranger; MG Montgomery, the commander of US forces in Somalia, controlled the US Quick Reaction Force (QRF); and LTG Bir of Turkey, the UNOSOM II Commander, controlled all other national contingents and US logistics forces. LTG Bir was not happy with the arrangement and complained about the fact that he did have control of his QRF. 47 This structure hindered the UN forces' ability to respond quickly to assist TF Ranger on 3 October.
FIGURE 1. UN AND US COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR UNOSOM II
The lack of unity was compounded by a lack of resources. This was particularly evident with introduction of UNOSOM II. UNOSOM II had a much more complex and difficult mandate with significantly less capability. The size of the US force decreased from 25,000 to 4,000.
Seventy-five percent of this smaller force was composed of combat service support units. 49 The UNITAF command and control structure capably planned and executed operations in nine humanitarian relief sectors and maintained control throughout the country. The UNISOM II staff was insufficiently resourced with a multi-national ad hoc team that had never operated together. 50 Somali warlords respected UNITAF's strength and when a visible decline in capability became apparent, the militia went on the offensive.
Another notable absence in the Somalia strategy was the lack a comprehensive humanitarian plan. Members of the relief community commented that they did not sense that there was a "uniting strategy." 51 Andrew Natsios, the President's Emergency Coordinator for Somalia, called for a comprehensive strategy that addressed humanitarian efforts and political rehabilitation. He believed that Somalis needed more than an infusion of food, yet, the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department of Defense (DOD) defined the problem as a shortage of food. Because of this minimal definition the successful delivery of food became the focus of the relief effort while development tasks were left to the relief organizations. 52 There were several apparent reasons for the problematic objectives, lack of unity of effort, and disconnects between the ends, ways, and means. The difference between President Bush and the UNSG's vision for the Somalia operation was never resolved. He was at the end of his term and conceded to the UNSG's desire for a more ambitious mandate but did not commit to providing the required resources. 53 DOD planned in accordance with the President's guidance and adopted his vision, yet the UN mandate remained unchanged. This unresolved dichotomy created a significant divergence between the US and the UN. 54 The transition of presidential administrations also contributed to the problems. President
Clinton inherited the operation but at the time was focused on his transition into office. He supported the UNSG's multilateral approach to solving complex world problems yet also shared President Bush's desire to minimize the US force contribution. As the level of conflict increased, President Clinton was forced to make adjustments to a strategy that he did not have a role in designing.
The lack of a comprehensive concept for humanitarian relief and political reconstruction was a result of a strategy formulation process that failed to integrate the efforts of the UN, relief organizations, and the US interagency. Such a process would have provided a more rigorous analysis of the situation and developed more appropriate objectives and concepts. It would also have provided greater unity to the humanitarian relief and security operations.
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: HAITI 1994-1996
In September 1994 a UN sanctioned, US military force entered Haiti in order to restore the democratically elected government of Jean Bertand Aristide. A delegation led by former President Jimmy Carter successfully negotiated the departure of Haitian strongman, LTG Raoul
Cedras, and the installation of President Aristide whom Cedras had overthrown in 1992 after his election. 55 This enabled US forces to conduct a permissive entry into Haiti and averted significant casualties on both sides.
Operation Uphold Democracy had five aims; the departure of Cedras and his supporters, the return to power of the democratically elected government, stopping the flow of Haitian migrants to US shores, a halt to the repression and terrorism employed by Haitian security forces against its populace, and the transition to a UN force that would allow the Haitian Government, the UN, and relief organizations to rebuild the country and alleviate the deplorable living conditions.
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In terms of these objectives, Uphold Democracy succeeded. President Aristide peacefully turned power over to another elected president in 1996, Haitian migrant flow to the US slowed significantly, the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) assumed control in March 1995, and enough stability was restored to enable relief agencies to address the humanitarian tasks. 57 The Clinton Administration was determined not to repeat the "mission creep" debacle of the previous fall in Somalia.
Because of the desire to not repeat Somalia, the US limited its objectives. The US defined success as turning the mission over to the UN, holding legitimate elections, and training a police force. 60 These objectives did not address the basis of Haiti's problems, an extreme lack of economic and political development. The failure to address these foundational problems prevented any long-term success. With the departure of the UN in 1996 many aspects of the previous conditions returned quickly. The disorder of 2004 is directly attributable to the failure to make a concerted effort to achieve political reform in the 1994-1996 time frame.
Planning for Haiti was unique in that two headquarters developed two different plans.
When it became apparent that a permissive entry into Haiti was possible, USACOM directed the 10 th Mountain Division to assume responsibility for planning and executing this option. The 18 th Airborne Corps continued refining the forced entry option. The parallel planning process enabled the flexibility that was required to shift from a forced to a permissive entry after the forced entry force was airborne. The capability of the Clinton Administration had matured and it incorporated the lessons Somalia operation taught it. As a result, a more mature strategy formulation process emerged.
The problems with incomplete coordination and planning are indicative of the fact that processes to enhance interagency inclusion were new. The objectives did not address the underlying causes of Haiti's problems because of a US aversion to nation-building tasks and the US military's desire to ensure a clear and attainable exit strategy.
COMMON DETERMINANTS OF SUCCESS OR FAILURE
Panama, Somalia, and Haiti provide excellent case studies of stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction. They offer useful insights into why success is elusive and yield three common determinants of success or failure. They are the rigor involved in developing and articulating objectives, the degree of unity of effort, and the congruence among ends, ways, and means.
In Panama, restore democracy was a poorly considered and articulated objective. As a result, the resources, planning, and commitment were not adequate to establish democratic governance and institutions. In Somalia, President Bush's initial objective to provide relief was attainable and well understood but it did not address the source of Somalia's problems.
President Clinton acknowledged the need for political and economic reconstruction but did not consider the consequences of attempting to take power from the warlords. The implementation of UNSCR 837 caused the conflict to spiral. The Haiti operation's objectives were attainable and clearly understood, but were insufficient to mandate the needed resources to create longterm stability. In each case, the operations' objectives were a source of failure.
A lack of unified effort hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of each of the three operations. In both Panama and Somalia the maintenance of security and stability were not integrated with humanitarian relief and nation-building operations. This significantly hindered Panama's recovery and prevented Somalia's. In Haiti the US made great efforts to build a plan that encompassed and integrated both security and humanitarian efforts and they yielded some short-term successes.
A third cause of failure was a lack of congruence between ends, ways, and means. In both Panama and Somalia political and economic development was critical to sustained national recovery. Both operations, however, lacked overarching strategic concepts for reconstruction.
In Haiti the UN and the US attempted to match ends, ways, and means and successfully achieved their immediate objectives. As previously discussed, the problem in Haiti was not the absence of a plan for reconstruction, but the short-term focus of the reconstruction objectives.
REASONS BEHIND THE CAUSES
The problematic objectives, lack of unity of effort, and lack of congruence among the ends, ways, and means are the result of two phenomena; the lack of a strategic planning and and processes that were lacking in joint doctrine. When President Bush assumed office his NSC published NSPD 1. It superseded PDD 56 though it did not provide the same degree of fidelity. 68 NSPD-XX, intended to provide that detail, has been awaiting signature and implementation for over two years. 69 As a result of a CSIS report titled "Play to Win" by the Commission on Post-Conflict JFCOM began the development of and experimentation with a concept known as the Joint
Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). The purpose of the JIACG is to provide interagency expertise within the combatant command that is also capable of reaching back to their agencies and to the NSC for guidance and resources. 72 This concept shows promise and is already present at several regional combatant commands. The problem exists with the support the agencies are able and willing to commit to the JIACG.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
The US Government should undertake a comprehensive initiative to develop a directive process that will unify the effort of every echelon and organization involved in the policy, planning, coordination, and execution of stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.
The US Congress should adopt legislation similar to the Winning the Peace Act. As a minimum this legislation should provide provisions similar to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 focused upon improving interagency capability to act in concert. Service in the interagency arena should be rewarded much as joint service in the military is rewarded. This act should allocate sufficient money to fund exercise and planning branches within each agency as well as personnel support for each regional combatant command's JIACG. The act should increase the number of internships, educational opportunities, and exchanges within and among government agencies, as this is an effective means of overcoming agency biases.
The most important provision of this act should be direction that an exercise program be conducted that involves the NSC, strategic and operational level commands, the interagency, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations. Such an exercise program would enable key individuals to develop relationships before the execution of a contingency, create a large body of stakeholders among the participants, and identify flaws and gaps in the processes and doctrine.
Government organizations, "think tanks," and academic institutions committed to the effort to improve our effectiveness in stability and reconstruction operations should be supported and should also be involved in collaborative efforts. Private organizations also play an important role, bring independent insight into the debate, and should be a part of the effort. Adopting these recommendations will give the US government the capability to develop a national level strategy that unifies the elements of national power and to more effectively conduct stability operations and post-conflict reconstruction.
SUMMARY
By early 2004 the US had experienced over 550 US soldier deaths in Iraq. No one can persuasively argue that the interagency was involved in developing the plans for post Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The US has been aware of a significant shortfall in its capacity to execute stability and reconstruction operations for well over a decade and it has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to address the problem. Without legislative direction and sufficient resources within the interagency, the US will not be capable of developing a process that will yield unified effort among all involved organizations. Without such a process it will continue to develop and execute disconnected strategies that fall well short of achieving its strategic objectives.
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